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MERCHANT SHIPPING IN A CHINESE
BLOCKADE OF TAIWAN
Lieutenant Michael C. Grubb, U.S. Navy
There is a substantial literature on the various methods and tactics the armedforces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could employ to enforce a
naval blockade of Taiwan during a Taiwan Strait crisis.1 However, there has been
very little assessment of how the qualities of today’s global maritime shipping
industry might affect the effectiveness of a blockade. If China chose to imple-
ment a blockade, would the global maritime industry continue to utilize Tai-
wan’s ports and support its import/export trade in the face of Chinese threats? If
international merchant shipping abandoned the Taiwan market, does the mari-
time industry of the Republic of China have sufficient capacity to keep its supply
lines filled on its own?
This article attempts to answer these questions, making the case that the
global maritime trade industry is not likely to support Taiwan’s seaborne trade
in the face of a PRC blockade, leaving Taiwan’s merchant fleet to meet the is-
land’s strategic resupply needs. Although the merchant fleet owned by Taiwan-
based interests is theoretically able to meet most of the island’s critical energy
and food supply demands on its own, the dynamics of vessel corporate owner-
ship and flag-of-convenience registry will likely place the burden of the resupply
effort on the small percentage of ships actually regis-
tered under the Republic of China (ROC) flag. With-
out support from foreign-flagged vessels, Taiwan’s
strategic resupply lines cannot be sustained.
Finally, recommendations for policy makers in Tai-
wan are offered: possible methods to mitigate capacity
deficiencies in specific areas of the ROC maritime
Lieutenant Grubb is a submarine officer currently
studying at the Naval War College. He received a BSE
degree in naval architecture and marine engineering
from the University of Michigan and has previously
served aboard the USS Miami (SSN 755) and on the
staff of Destroyer Squadron 22.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2007, Vol. 60, No. 1
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Winter 2007.vp
Wednesday, February 28, 2007 8:14:40 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Grubb: Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
trade industry; measures to offset physical vulnerabilities in shore-based infra-
structure; and considerations for fully exploiting the capabilities of modern
merchant ships. Shipping-related considerations for the United States and Japan
are also included, since a Taiwan Strait crisis could significantly impact interna-
tional maritime trade in the entire East Asian theater.
THE GLOBAL MARITIME SHIPPING INDUSTRY:
WOULD IT SUPPORT TAIWAN IN A CRISIS?
The global maritime shipping industry is a true reflection of global economic
interdependence. It is an ever more networked system in which the ships and
ports are portions of a seamless, interlocked land-sea transportation web. It
strives to deliver products from source to customer “just in time,” minimizing
costs of warehousing and delay. This goal has led to larger and faster ships that
exploit economies of scale and rely on large “megaports.” These megaports are
central destinations for containerized cargo shipped between major trade re-
gions; then they serve as transshipment distribution centers, shipping cargo on
smaller “feeder” ships to lesser intraregional ports in hub-and-spoke fashion.2
Asia, befitting its growing strength as the world’s leading manufacturing center,
now handles 62 percent of the world’s total container trade and hosts twenty of
the top thirty container ports by volume (including the top six). Taiwan’s port of
Kaohsiung ranks sixth in the world in container trade, handling 9.71 million
TEUs (twenty-foot-equivalent units) in 2004. Adding in Taiwan’s other ports,
total container traffic through Taiwan exceeds twelve million TEUs per year.3
Despite Taiwan’s growing influence as an economic and transportation hub,
it is doubtful that regional and global shipping interests would continue to use
its ports in the face of an open Chinese blockade of the island. There is little
economic incentive for ship or cargo owners to take that risk when the
megaports of Hong Kong, Singapore, Kalang, Tokyo, and Pusan can also trans-
ship non-Taiwan-specific cargoes. These alternate transshipment points can ab-
sorb the loss of Kaohsiung’s throughput, maintaining cargo distribution to
lesser regional ports. Removing Taiwan from the East Asian and global trans-
portation network would have noticeable short-term downstream economic ef-
fects on shipowners, shippers, and consumers while adjusting to the disruption,
but they would be negligible compared to the risks and possible costs of sending
shipping into an active war zone.
In an analysis of the economic impact of major labor disruptions that
stopped trade in American west coast ports during the fall of 2002, Peter V. Hall
demonstrates that there is little macroeconomic impact from even large ship-
ping disruptions until actual capacity is removed from the system.4 This im-
plies that the sinking of ships in a blockade of Taiwan could have significant
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downstream economic effects but also that shipowners would seek alterna-
tives, even if it meant short-term financial losses. Hall observes that suppliers
and consumers have an uncanny ability to exploit flexibility in the global trade
system in order to work around localized trade disruptions. If shippers who reg-
ularly use Taiwan’s ports as a transshipment point can easily find alternative ar-
rangements, consuming industries that rely on Taiwan’s exports will likewise be
able to find alternative sources. The short-term economic impact, then, may be
noticeable in certain market sectors, but a disruption in Taiwan’s trade will sim-
ply shift the competitive advantage of Taiwan’s exports (table 1) to exporters
who are not threatened by Chinese ballistic missiles and blockading forces.
There are important parallels with the reaction of merchant shipping to the
“tanker wars”of the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980s, but they do not hold up with re-
gard to the economics of Taiwan’s maritime trade. Contrary to some analysts, the
motivation of tankers to continue sailing through the war zone of the Persian Gulf
should not be used to predict how shipping might react in a China-Taiwan
scenario.5 The economic influences of oil were significantly greater and more com-
plex in the tanker wars than would be any cargo involved in Taiwanese trade.
During the tanker wars, there was no alternative free-market source for the
quantity of oil the Middle East could produce (figure 1). Despite reduced world
consumption following the “oil shocks”of the 1970s, the demand was sufficient to
buoy tanker freight rates well above anything shipowners could have gotten on
other trade routes. The enormous supertankers that carry Middle East crude are
specifically designed for the economics of the large-volume, long-distance crude
oil trade and were cost-prohibitive to operate on any other route at the time.6 The
rapid expansion of the world tanker fleet in the early 1970s, followed by market
instability and a global economic slowdown, reduced demand and produced a se-
vere overcapacity of tankers from 1979 to 1985 (figure 2). Hundreds of tankers
laid up, and the resale prices of new ships plummeted to scrap value.7
G R U B B 8 3
Export Commodity Value
(billion USD)




Transistors, valves, etc. 20.37 14.49 7.44
Office, automatic data processing (ADP)
machine parts, etc.
11.21 7.98 7.26
ADP equipment 10.68 7.60 5.47
Telecom equipment, parts, accessories 6.56 4.67 3.02
Electrical machinery 5.04 3.59 4.98
All export commodities 140.60 100.00 2.05
TABLE 1
TOP FIVE TAIWAN EXPORTS (2003)
Source: United Nations Council on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2005, Document TD/STAT.30 (New York: United Nations, 2005),
p. 163.
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Faced with heavy debt burdens
and the depreciating value of their
ships, then, owners had a real eco-
nomic incentive to risk sending
their ships into the Persian Gulf
war zone. For many the only other
option was bankruptcy. In the Tai-
wan scenario, however, there is no
similar overpowering economic
force to drive neutral ship and
cargo owners to risk attack from
blockading forces.
Similarly, the profiteering mo-
tivation for shipowners to sail
into danger in World Wars I and II
is not an apt comparison with re-
gard to the specifics and scope of a
China-Taiwan scenario.8 The world wars were full-scale, global conflicts. The
dramatic rise in freight rates seen then resulted from a prewar supply of mer-
chant ships and rapidly increasing demand once the wars started. For Great Brit-
ain, this demand ranged from importing raw materials to the home islands to
ferrying troops and supplies around the world. A scarcity of shipping resulted,
until, with all the inherent delays, wartime emergency fleets could be built. The
volume and diversity of trade involved in the allied war efforts were orders of
magnitude greater than would be required to support Taiwan in a cross-strait
crisis.
Furthermore, much of the debated profiteering by British shipowners in
World War I occurred early in the first year of the war, before the government
took full control of shipping. During this period most routes were relatively safe,
as unrestricted submarine warfare had not yet emerged. Martin Doughty argues
that although British shipowners were quite willing to take advantage of high
freight rates on safer routes outside active war zones, when it came to frontline
danger, “experience had shown that owners were unwilling to charter for such
services, no matter how generous the rates offered.”9 When unrestricted U-boat
warfare threatened the very survival of the country, patriotism sometimes over-
came this reluctance; otherwise, the government found ships for high-threat
routes by requisitioning, taking them up from trade.
Of course, some neutral shipowners and crews would be willing to run a Chi-
nese blockade for financial gain. History is filled with examples of mercenaries,
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FIGURE 1
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION BY REGION, 1987
Source: Data derived from the British Petroleum Co., BP Review of World Energy—1988 (London:
British Petroleum, 1988), pp. 4–5.
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privateers, and blockade runners
risking death in conflicts to which
they had no apparent patriotic,
ideological, or personal connec-
tion—but not in sufficient num-
bers to have an impact on the
ultimate outcome. Such privateers
may arise in a Taiwan scenario, but
it would be a grave error for Taipei
to expect large volumes of neutral-
flagged shipping to sail into
blockaded ports for the money.
Consequently, if five thousand
ships a month now call at Taiwan’s
ports, blockading PRC forces are
likely to find a much less target-
rich environment.10 With most
neutral shipping driven away, the
PRC would be well on its way to
cutting off trade to the island.
The remaining consideration would be whether the ROC merchant marine
was capable of sustaining Taiwan on its own. There is little doubt that the combi-
nation of a ballistic missile barrage and naval blockade would devastate Taiwan’s
economy, but if its populace chose to defy Chinese pressure, could the island’s
merchant marine supply food and energy at a basic survival level? Answering
this question requires a detailed examination of Taiwan’s food and energy sup-
ply lines and the capacity and capability of the ROC shipping industry.
TAIWAN’S MERCHANT MARINE FLEET
Taiwan boasts an impressive commercial fleet. According to Lloyd’s of London,
the fleet of merchant vessels owned by ROC-based interests ranks eleventh in
the world by deadweight, and sixth in Asia, behind Japan, China, Singapore,
Hong Kong, and South Korea.11 Its 28.40 million tonnes of shipping represents
2.8 percent of the world’s total deadweight tonnage, exceeding the proportional
value of global trade generated by Taiwan (approximately 2 percent).12 This makes
Taiwan one of the few major trading nations that contributes a surplus of ship-
ping capacity to the world market, relative to its own economic production. Of the
897 merchant vessels under ROC ownership, 767 are of one hundred gross tons or
more. Since vessels under a hundred gross tons do not contribute significantly,
further references to ROC-owned vessels apply only to those 767.13
G R U B B 8 5
FIGURE 2
WORLD OIL CONSUMPTION AND TANKER TONNAGE,
1968–88
Sources: Data derived from Michael Champness and Gilbert Jenkins, Oil Tanker Data Book—1985
(London: Elsevier Applied Science, 1985), pp. 5–19; and UN Council on Trade and Development,
Review of Maritime Transport 1987 (New York: United Nations, 1988), p. 12.
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Determining the ownership and controlling interest of merchant vessels,
however, is not always a clear-cut process. It is not uncommon for ships to have
different managers, operators, registered owners, and ultimate (actual) owners,
of different nationalities and in different locations. Of the 767 vessels ultimately
owned by ROC-based interests, only 383 (50 percent) are actually registered to
Taiwan corporations.14 Registered owners are often (but not always) subsidiaries
of larger parent corporations that actually own the vessels, established overseas
to exploit various tax, regulatory, and legal advantages. Furthermore, many cor-
porate shipowners are “nonoperating” or “absentee owners,” owners only in the
sense that they hold majority financial interests. Some large shipping conglom-
erates have financial interests in large fleets but actually operate vessels only in
certain market sectors; other owners are international financial and investment
holdings companies that charter their vessels to independent shipping compa-
nies on long-term operating contracts. Locating the actual controlling interest
of a particular vessel at any given time, then, can be a challenging endeavor in-
volving a maze of corporate relationships and contractual legalese.
But more important than legal ownership in determining what merchant
vessels would be available in a national emergency is flag of registry. The number
of these ships actually sailing under the Republic of China’s flag is considerably
smaller than the fleet owned by ROC-based interests. Of the 767 ROC-owned
vessels, only 213 (28 percent) are registered under the Republic of China flag—
by deadweight tonnage, 4.96 million tonnes, or 17 percent of the fleet total.15 Of
the remainder, over 80 percent are registered in Panama or Liberia.
The relatively high proportion of ROC-owned merchant ships under foreign
registry raises several security implications for Taiwan. Most significantly, the
foreign-flagged vessels would be effectively out of Taipei’s direct jurisdictional
reach in a crisis. While the government could immediately direct nationally reg-
istered shipping through legislative or executive action, extending centralized
control to foreign-flagged vessels would require the active cooperation of
shipowners.16 Even if ROC owners of foreign-flagged ships realigned their oper-
ations to support a war effort, they would have a loophole by which they could
pull their ships out of danger should Taiwan’s prospects or their own allegiances
waver.
The question of allegiance and sense of duty also applies to the crews. As with
most other major maritime trading nations, Taiwan’s domestic labor laws and
regulations extend to all ROC-flagged vessels, and they require that all nation-
ally registered ships have predominantly domestic crews.17 Conversely, foreign-
flagged vessels, being free of the costs and union restrictions of domestic labor,
typically employ diverse, multinational crews.18
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Registering ships under foreign “flags of convenience” dates back to the early
1800s, but only a very small percentage of ships were so registered prior to the
1950s.19 Consequently, the nationalities of most Allied mariners in World War II
corresponded to the registries of their ships (the crews of British-flagged ships
were predominantly British nationals, and so on).20 Nonetheless, British and
American merchant fleets both experienced inefficiencies due to absentee and
discipline issues prior to 1940–41. In particular, employer-union relations in the
U.S. merchant fleet were tumultuous prior to American entry into the war. The
fall of France and the attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized the merchant mariners
into the brave, highly dedicated force that is remembered as one of the keys to
victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.21 Today, however, with a high proportion of
foreign-flagged, foreign-crewed ships, the Republic of China cannot count on
such spirit in its merchant fleet.
The Taiwan government recognizes this dilemma, but there are no quick fixes
or easy answers. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC)
has revised regulatory structures in order to encourage national registry of new
ships.22 However, Taiwan’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO)
has exposed to foreign competition domestic shipping sectors that had previ-
ously favored national-flag carriers. Additionally, a recent survey of shipowners
in Taiwan revealed that the high cost of domestic crews remains a significant dis-
incentive to registering vessels under the ROC flag. A chronic shortage of quali-
fied domestic mariners, in fact, impedes any expansion of the national-flagged fleet.
Survey respondents also cited special requirements upon ships registered in Taiwan—
restricting them from calling directly at PRC ports and mandating enrollment
in multiple ship-classification societies—as major economic disincentives.23
As a whole, the ROC merchant fleet is dominated numerically by
containerships and dry bulk carriers. Combined, they account for 50 percent of
the ships and 73 percent of the total deadweight. The container sector forms the
core strength of the fleet; Evergreen Marine Corporation alone owns seventy
modern containerships, with a total capacity in excess of 280,000 TEUs.24 Ever-
green is the largest container owner-operator line in Asia and second in the
world only to the A. P. Moller Group of Denmark (the parent company of
Maersk Lines).25 Not far behind, Taiwan’s Yang Ming Marine Transport Com-
pany and Wan Hai Lines own container fleets of forty-seven (83,934 TEU) and
forty (124,513 TEU) ships, respectively.
One hundred fourteen of Taiwan’s containerships are modern, high-speed
vessels with service speeds in excess of twenty knots; of these, forty-one are capa-
ble of sustained speeds of twenty-five knots or more.26 Containerships are typi-
cally considered to have less strategic lift utility than roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)
vessels with respect to support of armed forces (since tanks, trucks, artillery
G R U B B 8 7
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pieces, etc., do not fit neatly into standard shipping containers), but Taiwan’s
large, high-speed containerships could be valuable assets in resupply. High
speed increases cargo throughput by minimizing delivery cycle times and re-
duces vulnerability to submarine attack. While it is typically uneconomical un-
der normal peacetime conditions, both liquid and dry bulk cargoes can be
containerized, and the ability to transport these cargoes at sustained speeds of
twenty to twenty-five knots offers notable advantages.
CRITICAL CARGO CAPACITY: ENERGY AND FOOD SUPPLY
Maintaining a flow of energy to Taiwan through a PRC blockade would pose for-
midable challenges for ROC leadership. Taiwan is not blessed with abundant
natural resources; aside from the electrical power produced by its three nuclear
power plants and a small contribution from hydro power, virtually all of its en-
ergy is supplied from imported oil, coal, and natural gas.27 An August 2005 U.S.
Department of Energy study found that Taiwan has proven in-ground petro-
leum reserves of only four million barrels, yielding approximately 8,400 barrels
per day in domestic production.28 Since domestic demand consumes approxi-
mately a million barrels per day,
this can hardly be counted as a
strategic reserve. The inadequacy
in natural reserves is offset by reg-
ulatory requirements that Taiwan’s
petroleum refiners maintain at
least a sixty-day supply of product
against potential supply disrup-
tions. Additionally, the Taipei
government established an oil
stockpile in 2001, sized to meet do-
mestic demand for thirty days.29
This combined ninety days of
gasoline and other petroleum-
based products, however, offers
no security for the industrial and
power-generation sectors, which
are heavily dependent on (im-
ported) coal and natural gas. To
protect them, an Energy Management Law mandates that an unspecified coal
“safety level” be maintained in storage. Likewise, the Regulations for Imple-
menting the Energy Management Law require utilities supplying natural gas to
cities to maintain gas storage facilities, again without setting a minimum reserve
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 3
TAIWAN’S ENERGY SUPPLY STRUCTURE, 2005
Source: Taiwan Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs, “Energy Supply (by Energy Form),
www.moeaec.gov.tw/.
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level.30 Literature indicates that the Taiwan Power Company (TaiPower) main-
tains a sixty-day supply of coal and that the Chinese Petroleum Corporation
(CPC) maintains a seven-day supply of liquefied natural gas in storage against
disruptions.31
In the oil sector, 77 percent of Taiwan’s imports come from the Middle East.
The remaining 23 percent is imported from a variety of sources, primarily West
African and Southeast Asian petroleum suppliers.32 Virtually all of the imports
are ultimately handled by one of two petroleum companies that dominate the
Taiwanese market. One of them, CPC, held a monopoly over all aspects of Tai-
wan’s petroleum market until deregulation in the late 1990s and WTO member-
ship in 2001 allowed the Formosa Petrochemical Company to make inroads.
To supply their refining and distribution networks in Taiwan, both CPC and
Formosa Petrochemical own and operate fleets of oil tankers.33 Together, their
forty tankers account for 65 percent of the ROC-owned tanker fleet (sixty-two
ships) and 70 percent of its total deadweight (5.49 million tonnes).34 Taiwan’s
tanker fleet includes seventeen very large crude carriers (tankers of 150,000–
299,999 deadweight tonnes, commonly referred to as VLCCs), all of them
owned by either Chinese Petroleum, Formosa Petrochemical, the Sincere Navi-
gation Company, or the Taiwan Maritime Transportation Corporation. The re-
maining forty-five hulls comprise a variety of smaller shuttle tankers, chemical
tankers, and petroleum product tankers. These smaller tankers would play a vi-
tal role in a blockade scenario, since the deep draft of fully laden VLCCs prohib-
its them from entering Taiwan’s ports. VLCCs must discharge their cargo at one
of Taiwan’s two offshore moorings or transfer cargo to smaller shuttle tankers
for delivery to port.35
Forty percent of Taiwan’s total owned tanker fleet is domestically flagged,
which represents only 30 percent of the total tanker deadweight (table 2). Of the
seventeen VLCCs, only the six owned by CPC fly the Republic of China flag. This
becomes potentially important with respect to the ROC tanker fleet’s ability to
meet the petroleum demand should international carriers abandon the Taiwan
market in the face of a Chinese blockade.
As table 3 illustrates, the total ROC-owned tanker fleet has, theoretically,
enough capacity to meet 105 percent of Taiwan’s crude oil demand. Realistically,
however, without foreign-flagged tankers only 31 percent of the current
monthly oil import demand could be accommodated (table 4). Even including
ROC-owned but foreign-flagged tankers, there would be little margin for losses
in the fleet. Any losses, whether resulting from interdiction by blockaders, rou-
tine mechanical or operational casualties, or failure of political allegiance
among owners or crews, would have immediate consequences for Taiwan’s en-
ergy supply.
G R U B B 8 9
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This lack of capacity margin is especially acute given the size of individual
tankers. For example, the loss of Chinese Petroleum’s VLCC M/T Dar Yun, at
262,618 tonnes deadweight, would take a 4.8 percent bite out of Taiwan’s total
fleet, 16.2 percent of the ROC-flagged crude oil transport capacity. German
U-boats in World War II had to sink over fifteen of the T2-SE-A1 tankers of the
day (16,613 tonnes deadweight each) to destroy as much British crude oil. Like-
wise, the loss of just five VLCCs would equal the gross tonnage U-boats claimed
by sinking 144 ships in June 1942, their deadliest month in the entire war.36
The security of Taiwan’s energy transport is even more tenuous in the lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) sectors. Following
world energy market trends, the use of LNG and LPG is rapidly expanding in
Taiwan. Over six million tonnes of LNG is imported annually (equating to over
nine billion cubic meters of natural gas, once re-gasified), and demand is pro-
jected to increase as more industries shift to cleaner-burning fuels.37 To meet this
import demand there is currently only one LNG tanker in the ROC-owned mer-
chant fleet—the Liberian-flagged M/T Golar Mazo is under long-term contract
to supply LNG to Taiwan. The ship is co-owned by Golar LNG Company and
CPC (a minority owner, with a 40 percent share).38 The Golar Mazo is able to
meet only 23 percent of the import demand; the remainder of the LNG shipping
capacity is made up by foreign-owned LNG tankers.
Although the lack of additional ROC-owned LNG tankers represents a strate-
gic vulnerability, it is striking that the Golar Mazo alone is able to meet roughly a
quarter of the import demand of Taiwan. Consequently, on one hand, only four
average-sized LNG tankers are required to be operating at any one time to meet
Taiwan’s total import demand. This is primarily due to the relatively close





Number % DWT (t) DWT (%)
Containerships 197 32 16 7,151,211 841,248 12
Oil tankers 62 25 40 5,490,698 1,620,767 30
LNG tankers 1 0 0 76,210 0 0
LPG tankers 6 0 0 134,053 0 0
Dry bulk carriers 186 25 13 13,639,555 2,253,998 17
General cargo carriers 130 20 15 1,113,150 71,838 6
Others 185 111 60 795,625 175,679 22
Total 767 213 28 28,400,502 4,963,530 17
TABLE 2
TAIWAN’S MERCHANT FLEET BY SHIP TYPE AND FLAG OF REGISTRY
Source: Compiled from Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence Unit, Lloyd’s Maritime Directory 2006, pp. 978–93.
Note: Includes only vessels of 100 gross tons or more. Combination oil and dry bulk carriers are counted under the Oil Tanker category. All other
combination carriers are counted as General Cargo Carriers. Bulk cement and woodchip carriers are counted as Others vice Dry Bulk Carriers. The
unit (t) represents metric tonnes (1t = 1,000 kg = 0.98 long tons).
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geographic proximity of natural gas exporters to Taiwan; 58 percent of Taiwan’s
natural gas imports in 2004 came from Indonesia and 40 percent from Malaysia.39
Where the distances to crude oil and LPG suppliers in the Middle East are such
that each VLCC and LPG tanker can make less than one round-trip delivery to
Taiwan per month, each LNG tanker can complete an average of 2.1 round trips
per month.40 On the other hand, the large proportion of Taiwan’s LNG trade
represented by each tanker makes them particularly high-value targets. LNG
tanks worldwide are in high demand and scarce; the loss of any would quickly
produce detrimental downstream effects on Taiwan’s electrical system, which
relies on natural gas for 23 percent of its total installed generation capacity.41
Although smaller than LNG in total volume consumed, liquefied petroleum
gas also plays a key role in meeting Taiwan’s energy needs. Unlike LNG, most of
Taiwan’s LPG supply goes to residential and commercial markets. (There are
roughly ten thousand LPG-fueled vehicles on Taiwan’s roads.)42 To supply this
demand there are six LPG tankers in the ROC-owned fleet, none of which fly the
Republic of China flag. Despite its small numerical size, this fleet of six LPG
tankers under normal circumstances meets 114 percent of Taiwan’s monthly
LPG import demand, providing a limited margin of excess capacity.
As with the LNG sector, the vulnerabilities for Taiwan in the LPG tanker sec-
tor arise from the small number of its ships in the trade, the fact that all are



































Crude oil 52.25 5.05 6.34 0.84 5.33 0.28 105
Liq. natural gas (LNG) 6.40 1.30 0.14 2.10 0.29 -1.01 23
Liq. petroleum gas (LPG) 0.89 0.14 0.19 0.84 0.16 0.02 114
Dry bulk cargoes (total) 69.22 7.08 17.05 1.12 19.10 12.02 270
Coal 60.37 6.04 - - - - -
Wheat grain 1.29 0.14 - - - - -
Corn 5.10 0.63 - - - - -
Soybeans 2.46 0.27 - - - - -
TABLE 3
ROC MERCHANT FLEET CAPACITY FOR CRITICAL CARGOES: ALL ROC-OWNED SHIPS
Sources: All ship capacity data derived from Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence Unit, Lloyd’s Maritime Directory 2006, pp. 978–93; and Lloyd’s Register–Fairplay Ltd.,
Register of Ships 2006–2007. Import demand data from the Taiwan Bureau of Energy, “Energy Balance Sheet 1-26.94”; and Council of Agriculture, “Food Bal-
ance Sheet.”
Note: Mt = million metric tonnes. Mm3 = million cubic meters.
a. Total dry bulk capacity includes bulk cargo capacity of applicable general cargo ships.
b. Based on average transit cycle time to primary import sources for each commodity. Assumes two-day load/unload time in port and 14-knot average transit speed.
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foreign-flagged, and the disproportionate capacity of individual vessels. Two of
the LPG tankers operated by the Formosa Plastics Marine Company represent
together 81 percent of the fleet’s cargo capacity and are Taiwan’s only vessels
suited for efficient long-haul deliveries from LPG suppliers in the Middle East.43
Coal is the third pillar of Taiwan’s imported energy supply. Surpassing natu-
ral gas, coal provides 29 percent of the generation capacity of Taiwan’s electrical
power grid, accounting for 76 percent of the 60.37 million tonnes of coal Taiwan
imported in 2005.44 Indigenous coal production ceased in 2001; Taiwan now
purchases 10 percent of total coal imported worldwide, behind only the Euro-
pean Union (30 percent as a whole) and Japan (25 percent).45 Of some strategic
concern in a China-Taiwan scenario would be the fact that a plurality of Taiwan’s
imported coal supply comes from mainland China (41 percent in 2004), the re-
mainder primarily from Indonesia (32 percent) and Australia (21 percent). This
concern is offset by the overall strength of the global coal supplies; such large
coal producers/exporters as Australia, Russia, Indonesia, and the United States
could easily supply Taiwan’s demand if supplies from the mainland were cut.46
When assessing the ability of Taiwan’s merchant fleet to sustain coal imports
in a crisis, however, the entire range of dry bulk imports must be considered. The
same dry bulk carriers used to transport coal to Taiwan will also be in demand to
carry critical agricultural bulk cargoes, especially wheat grain, corn products, and



































Crude oil 52.25 5.05 1.84 0.84 1.55 -3.50 31
Liq. natural gas (LNG) 6.40 1.30 0.00 2.10 0.00 -1.30 0
Liq. petroleum gas (LPG) 0.89 0.14 0.00 0.84 0.00 -0.14 0
Dry bulk cargoes (total) 69.22 7.08 2.62 1.12 2.93 -4.15 41
Coal 60.37 6.04 - - - - -
Wheat grain 1.29 0.14 - - - - -
Corn 5.10 0.63 - - - - -
Soybeans 2.46 0.27 - - - - -
TABLE 4
ROC MERCHANT FLEET CAPACITY FOR CRITICAL CARGOES: ROC-FLAGGED SHIPS ONLY
Sources: All ship capacity data derived from Lloyd’s Maritime Intelligence Unit, Lloyd’s Maritime Directory 2006, pp. 978–93; and Lloyd’s Register–Fairplay Ltd.,
Register of Ships 2006–2007. Import demand data from the Taiwan Bureau of Energy, “Energy Balance Sheet 1-26.94”; and Council of Agriculture, Food Supply
& Utilization Annual Report 2003.
Note: Mt = million metric tonnes. Mm3 = million cubic meters.
a. Total dry bulk capacity includes bulk cargo capacity of applicable general cargo ships.
b. Based on average transit cycle time to primary import sources for each commodity. Assumes two-day load/unload time in port and 14-knot average transit speed.
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soybeans. Whereas other food imports, such as beef, chicken, fruits, vegetables,
and processed foods, are typically containerized, most cereals are transported in
loose bulk form. Taiwan depends on considerable quantities of the latter, and
they would compete with coal for dry bulk import capacity.
Food security is also a national security concern. Like energy, a substantial pro-
portion of Taiwan’s basic food supplies is imported and could be threatened in a
China-Taiwan conflict. Changing demographics on traditional family farms and
the opening of domestic agricultural markets to foreign imports following Taiwan’s
WTO membership have caused considerable shifts in food import-export trade
patterns and, in turn, a review of Taiwan’s food security and agricultural policies.47
Taiwan was self-sufficient in rice, fruits, vegetables, and meat through 2003,
but the long-term health of these sectors is not assured; the farming population
is shrinking, and trade protections are being dropped in accordance with WTO
regulations. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of the demand for wheat and soy-
beans is met by domestic production. Domestic corn production is sufficient for
human consumption but meets less than 1 percent of the nearly five million
tonnes required for livestock feed. To make up domestic shortfalls, 5.10 million
tonnes of corn, 2.46 million tonnes of soybeans, and 1.29 million tonnes of
wheat grain are imported annually.48 The United States is the primary supplier
of these commodities, providing 99 percent of the corn cereals, 74 percent of the
soybeans, and 71 percent of the wheat grain imported to Taiwan as of June 2005.
Wheat from Australia (27 percent) and soybeans from Brazil (26 percent) make
up the majority of the remainder.49
In order to support price stability and enhance food security, the ROC gov-
ernment regularly buys stocks of key agricultural products. The exact sizes of
these stockpiles vary with market prices, but on average the government-held
stocks roughly equate to a 4.5-month supply of rice, a 3.4-month supply of
wheat, and a 1.8-month supply of corn.50
Although critical to sustaining Taiwan’s food supply, the combined 0.74 mil-
lion tonnes of imported corn, soybeans, and wheat each month is small com-
pared to the five million tonnes of coal per month that would compete for
shipping during a crisis scenario. Fortunately, the dry bulk sector that must
carry the combined load is one of relative strength for the ROC merchant ma-
rine. It is the second largest by number of total ships owned (186) and leads the
way in combined deadweight, at 13.64 million tonnes. It is largely a new and
modern fleet, and it could readily handle the combined 5.77 million tonnes per
month of combined coal and agricultural commodities if fully available in a cri-
sis (see table 3). In fact, thanks to the short average delivery cycle times resulting
from the availability of coal in Indonesia and both wheat and coal in Australia,
total import delivery capacity is nearly triple the domestic monthly demand for
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critical coal and agricultural bulk products. This large capacity of the total dry
bulk fleet allows a significant margin for losses. Further, the total ROC-owned
dry bulk fleet is sized to accommodate a wide variety of import and export dry
bulk products that would not be considered vital in a China-Taiwan conflict.
Bulk commodities such as iron ore and coke imports for steel production and
exported quarry products like sand, gravel, and limestone aggregate are vital to
the long-term health of the Taiwan economy but not critical to basic survival.51
Optimism arising from excess capacity in the dry bulk sector, however, must
be tempered by realism. First, limiting the dry bulk fleet to critical cargoes would
require convincing (or coercing) owners with vested financial interest in non-
critical cargoes (such as China Steel Express Corporation, the shipping subsid-
iary of a major Taiwanese steel manufacturer) to shift away from them for the
greater good of the island’s populace. A second area of risk is inherent in flags of
convenience, as shown in tables 2 and 4. Were ROC shipowners with foreign-
flagged vessels to abandon Taiwan, the dry bulk capacity margin would vanish.
In a worst-case scenario, the ROC-flagged dry bulk fleet could itself hope to
meet less than half (41 percent) of Taiwan’s import demand. This highlights the
influence that the decisions of the ROC shipowners with foreign-flagged vessels
would have on the ability of Taiwan to endure a blockade.
MARITIME TRADE INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITIES
The concerns for Taiwan’s merchant shipping industry’s ability to sustain the
nation in a time of war are not limited to the ships themselves. Its shore-based
infrastructure is also subject to question, in regard to geography and redundant
capacity. The concerns regarding geography are fairly evident and have been
well covered elsewhere.52 Taiwan has seven major ports: Kaohsiung, Keelung,
Suao, Taipei, Taichung, Hualien, and Anping. Kaohsiung handles 67 percent of
the total cargo volume, with Keelung second at 15 percent.53 Kaoshiung is also
the home of Taiwan’s only shipyard capable of dry-docking large, deep-draft
vessels, as well as of its most productive oil refinery.54 The disproportionate con-
centration of facilities at Kaohsiung makes it an obvious target of any Chinese
blockade, and the shallow-water bathymetry of its approaches would favor
PLAN submarines and mines over Taiwan’s ASW and mine clearance.
The infrastructure limitations become even more evident with regard to spe-
cific market sectors. For containerized commodities, the ports of Keelung, Taipei,
and Taichung, with substantial container-handling capacity, could relieve pres-
sure on Kaohsiung, but only Keelung and Taichung are deep enough (i.e., more
than fifteen meters) to handle the largest modern containerships. None of the ma-
jor container ports are on Taiwan’s east coast, where they could be better sheltered
from PRC blockade forces. In the energy sector, Chinese Petroleum’s Ta-Lin-Pu
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and Sha Lung offshore oil terminals are the only facilities capable of discharging
VLCCs directly to shore, and Yungan has currently the country’s only LNG receiv-
ing terminal.55 As in the container sector, none of these major terminals are on
Taiwan’s east coast, and a single west-coast port, Taichung, handles a dispropor-
tionately high volume of Taiwan’s coal imports (45 percent in July 2006).56
The equipment at Taiwan’s ports poses vulnerability concerns as well. As a re-
sult of growth in the size of ships and an overall maritime trade industry push
for greater efficiency, few of today’s container or dry bulk carriers are capable of
loading or unloading themselves. Only two of Taiwan’s containerships with ca-
pacities over two thousand TEUs can do so, and only 42 percent of the ROC-
owned dry bulk carriers are equipped with cranes or derricks. This fraction
drops to only 6 percent for ROC-flagged bulk carriers alone. As is typical of the
maritime industry worldwide, only smaller general-cargo carriers that serve lo-
cal and regional feeder routes are equipped with their own cranes or derricks.
Seventy-eighty percent of Taiwan’s 133 general-cargo carriers are self-load/
unload capable, but they are small, with a combined capacity of only 10,977
TEUs (roughly equivalent to two large containerships).57
All this makes the shore-based cargo-handling equipment an attractive target
for air or ballistic-missile attack. Furthermore, much of the port terminal equip-
ment is highly specialized and difficult to replace or work around. Container-
handling cranes are mammoth pieces of machinery, and only they can reach
efficiently across the thirty-to-forty-meter beams of large containerships. The
same applies to sophisticated bulk cargo–handling gear, which can unload coal
or the like at rates of up to two thousand tonnes per hour.58 Unloading large con-
tainer and bulk cargo ships with ad hoc, temporary cranes following an attack
on port facilities would produce substantial delays, making ships more vulnera-
ble to attack in port and slowing the flow of vital supplies into the country. Like-
wise, only the terminal at Yungan has the specialized equipment and storage
facilities necessary for re-gasifying imported LNG, making it another tempting
target for air strikes. Destruction of such key terminals would make the ability of
Taiwan’s merchant ships to supply them irrelevant.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIPEI, TOKYO, AND WASHINGTON
For the People’s Republic of China, hitting a few of Taiwan’s merchant ships,
even nonlethally, may be enough to achieve the desired effect. The delays in-
curred in nursing damaged merchant ships into port (possibly under fire) and
making repairs could remove enough capacity from service to have serious re-
percussions. Also, the spectacle of damaged, burning ships could give pause to
owners or flag states of foreign-registered vessels; while Taiwan’s energy and
food import needs could theoretically be met by the total fleet of ROC-owned
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shipping, it is not realistic to expect that this full capacity would be available in a
China-Taiwan conflict. Any losses in tanker or dry bulk throughput capacity,
whether due to actual loss of or damage to ships, their removal from the market
by wavering resolution among their owners or crews, or disablement of port fa-
cilities will have severe consequences for Taiwan’s ability to sustain the inflow of
critical energy and food supplies.
Taiwan, then, occupies a tenuous position with respect to its merchant ma-
rine. Its policy makers would do well to continue and support efforts to ease reg-
ulatory and economic barriers to the expansion of the ROC-flagged merchant
fleet. Such efforts might include education and training initiatives to increase
the pool of native merchant mariners, as well as subsidies to encourage local
shipowners to register under the Taiwan flag. Admittedly, the latter would be po-
litically difficult both home and abroad, since it is often viewed as “corporate wel-
fare”and would undercut WTO attempts to reduce shipping industry subsidies.59
Secondly, Taiwan might develop contingency plans for increasing the capac-
ity of ROC-controlled shipping in an emergency. Relying on Taiwan’s financial
reserves to charter or purchase vessels from the international market has been
proposed.60 The former, however, is not a simple or guaranteed solution; vessels
available for charter in peacetime may not be when tensions rise. This leaves out-
right purchase as an option, but as shipping market conditions fluctuate, ships
of types that are particularly useful for national security may not be available in
sufficient quantity when needed. Finally, since the Chinese would most likely
control the timing of crisis escalation, they would be in position to charter or
buy up available shipping before Taipei could do so.61
More realistically, Taiwan could increase the cargo throughput capacity of its
east coast ports. Possible approaches include expansion and diversification of
facilities at existing harbors, as well as the construction of additional artificial
harbors like the new port at Ho-Ping.62 Such improvements would, of course,
entail making sure that the road and rail infrastructure is sufficient to move
cargo inland efficiently from east coast ports should they become of primary
importance during a conflict.
Relatedly, nontraditional and improvised methods for unloading cargo from
merchant ships could be developed and rehearsed. They might involve provi-
sions for ad hoc pierside facilities or small, crane-equipped ships for lightering
larger deep-draft vessels that cannot enter Taiwan’s small east coast ports. Like-
wise, the ability to salvage cargo from damaged vessels stranded offshore should
not be underemphasized. Taipei might also investigate containerization of petro-
leum products and dry bulk cargoes. In that way, in extremis, the strength of the
ROC containership fleet could be leveraged to alleviate strain on the tanker and
dry bulk carrier sectors.
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Finally, it would be important to ensure that plans for the naval control and
protection of shipping are kept current and periodically exercised. These ends
can be served by convoy exercises and regular hydrographic mapping of safety
corridors in and out of ROC ports, in order to minimize the time required for
mine-countermeasure efforts in an actual conflict.
Of course, it is by no means required or certain that either Japan or the United
States would become directly involved in a China-Taiwan conflict, but at a mini-
mum both nations would need to consider the larger impact on merchant ship-
ping in the region. For instance, in view of the potential for spillover into a larger
regional conflict, any U.S.-Japanese response to a Chinese blockade would nec-
essarily involve naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS) in the
entire East Asian theater. Preparation for such a prospect is a lofty challenge, re-
quiring extensive intergovernment and interagency coordination, since the ex-
isting NCAGS structure in the Pacific is less mature than in traditional NATO
operating areas.63 Nonetheless, it could capitalize upon the post-9/11 coopera-
tion in multinational maritime domain awareness, as well as upon the NCAGS
framework developed through Pacific and Indian Ocean Shipping Working
Group’s BELL BUOY exercises.64
A blockade is just one of the numerous coercive options, in a continuum of
force, that the People’s Republic of China could employ against Taiwan. It can
exploit vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s maritime trade industry to force capitulation
without an all-out attack that would be risky in itself and might turn the island
into rubble. But as others have concluded, the question ultimately boils down to
Taiwan’s will to resist.65 If a blockade triggers a spirit of nationalism and resis-
tance on Taiwan, the latent strengths of the ROC merchant marine could quickly
emerge and validate Vice Admiral Ko Tun-hwa’s declaration that “unless each
farmer’s house is bombed, there will still be enough vegetables, chickens, eggs,
and pigs to live on. All of the buses and cars may be forced to stop running due to
shortage of fuel, but people can still travel on foot or on bicycles, and the buses
can still be towed by water buffalo or horses.”66
But there is an equal chance that the sight of the first tanker burning off
Kaohsiung will exacerbate Taiwan’s sense of vulnerability, tear rifts in national
identity and political allegiance, and incite panic on the island. 67 This possibility
alone makes a blockade a completely viable option for the PRC. Furthermore, in
the age of “CNN warfare,” the sight of merchant ships burning may be enough to
prevent shipowners from allowing their ships to enter the war zone, or, even
more significantly, deter the American public from redeeming Taiwan’s hope
that U.S. forces will come riding over the horizon to their rescue.
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